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Is Managing Earnings 
Ethically Acceptable? 
Survey shows age and seniority affect attitudes on earnings 
management. 
BY KENNETH ROSENZWEIG, 
CMA, AND MARILYN FISCHER 
I s managing earnings through ac-counting methods ethically ac-ceptable? That's the question we recently asked a sample group of 
management accountants. The re-
sponse to the survey was enlightening. 
Our survey was designed as a fol-
low-up and extension of the research 
done by Bruns and Merchant and pub-
lished in MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT-
ING® in August 1990.1 They found that 
managers disagreed considerably on 
whether earnings management is eth-
ically acceptable. They also found that 
in general the respondents thought 
manipulating earnings via operating 
decisions was more ethically accept-
able than manipulation by accounting 
methods. Bruns and Merchant were 
disturbed by these findings. They were 
concerned that these practices could 
be misleading to users of the informa-
tion and, over time, reduce the credi-
bility of accounting numbers and 
thereby damage the reputation of the 
accounting profession. 
Bruns and Merchant surveyed man-
agers, but accountants as well can in-
fluence the level of reported earnings 
either directly by means of their im-
pact on the choice of accounting meth-
ods or indirectly by monitoring the ac-
tions of managers who influence 
reported earnings. To learn more 
about accountants' attitudes toward 
earnings management, we surveyed 
265 members of a regional organiza-
tion of accountants (approximately 38% 
of the total membership). Our ques-
tionnaire was adapted from the one 
used by Bruns and Merchant and in-
cluded 13 descriptions of managerial 
actions. The accountants were asked 
to rate these actions on a 5-point scale 
from "ethical" to "totally unethical." 
(See "Earnings Management Ques-
tions," p. 34.) 
For the purpose of this study, we de-
fine earnings management in terms of 
the actions of a manager that are in-
tended to increase (decrease) current 
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Valuation 
reported earnings of the unit for which 
the manager is responsible without 
generating a corresponding increase 
(decrease) in the long-term economic 
profitability of the unit. Our definition 
is consistent with the way Bruns and 
Merchant used the term, although 
there is no standard, widely accepted 
definition of earnings management. 
The 13 questions on the survey can 
be grouped by categories (called "fac-
tors") of earnings management ac-
tions. Two of these factors involve ac-
counting manipulation, and two 
involve operating decisions designed 
to influence reported earnings. The ac-
counting factors include actions that 
influence earnings by changing ac-
counting methods. Examples include 
recording an expense in the wrong 
year or changing an inventory valua-
tion in order to influence earnings. Ex-
amples of operating decision manipu-
lations are deferring necessary 
expenditures to a subsequent year or 
offering unusually attractive terms to 
customers at year-end to draw next 
year's sales into the current year. 
ACCOUNTANTS' ATIITUDES: 
SURVEY RESULTS 
T able 1 lists the mean score for the 13 questions, grouped by factors . To calculate factor 
scores, we averaged accountants' ethi-
cal ratings for the managers' actions 
10 Write up inventory-product development 1.49 1.50 
11 Write up inventory-profit target 
4 Record supplies next year 
8 Prepay next-year expenses 
12 Delay consultant's invoice-small 
13 Delay consultant's invoice-large 
Paint ahead of schedule 
2 Defer expenditures-month 
3 Defer expenditures- year 
5 Pull sales-liberal terms 
6 Overtime to maximize shipments 
7 Sell excess assets-profit 
1 = serious; 0 = totally unethical. 
that were included in that factor. The 
table shows that the accounting prac-
titioners participating in the survey rat-
ed accounting manipulation much less 
acceptable ethically than operating de-
cision manipulation. This finding par-
allels the attitude Bruns and Merchant 
found among managers. In our survey 
the accountants gave accounting ma-
nipulation an average rating between a 
moderate and a serious ethical infrac-
tion. They saw manipulation of inven-
tory valuations as being just as ques-
tionable ethically as other forms of 
accounting manipulation. 
Generally, the practitioners had few 
ethical qualms about operating deci-
sion manipulation. For these factors, 
the practitioners' scores indicated an 
average rating between (fully) ethical 
and questionable. The practitioners, 
however, generally felt that operating 
decisions that influenced expenses 
were somewhat more suspect than 
1.29 
1.71 
1.51 
1.73 
1.76 
0.85 
3.82 
3.44 
3.38 
3.12 
3.19 
3.55 
3.70 
3.75 
those that influenced revenues. 
We also looked at whether there 
was a correlation between the accoun-
tants' answers and their experience 
and level of responsibility. Table 2 sug-
gests that accountants with more 
years of accounting experience are 
more tolerant of operating decision 
manipulation that affected reported 
expenses than are their less experi-
enced colleagues. Consistent with this 
finding, Table 3 shows that accoun-
tants with higher levels of organiza-
tional responsibility rate operating de-
cision manipulations of both types as 
more ethical than do accountants with 
less responsibility. 
ETHICALLY TROUBLING 
RESULTS 
Like Bruns and Merchant, we are disturbed by these findings . That accountants are more sen-
TABLE 2 I DIFFERENCES IN MEANS OF ETHICAL RATINGS OF OPERATING 
DECISION MANIPULATION AFFECTING OPERATING EXPENSE AT 
DIFFERENT EXPERIENCE LEVELS 
Experience Level 
·:-_:1 ~~,~~'jF·· -_. __ :;: ·:-·,·,.. 
~~..:..hi'II:"~~ .. Gt-;,..._.2--... • :.-'-. 
Six years or less 56 3.131 0 
Greater than six years 209 3.5231 
4 = ethical; 3 = questionable; 2 = moderate; 1 =serious; 0 = totally unethical. 
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sitive to accounting manipulation than 
operating manipulation is understand-
able in light of their training and expe-
rience. Several of the situations in the 
survey dealing with accounting ma-
nipulation not only involved ethically 
questionable practices, but they also 
involved violations of accepted ac-
counting practice. For example, in sur-
vey question Number 4, the deferral of 
the recording of supplies received to a 
future accounting period is clearly a vi-
olation of generally accepted account-
ing principles. Analogous professional 
standards do not exist for the situa-
tions described in the operating ma-
nipulation questions. 
The fact that the profession does 
not have explicit standards against op-
erating manipulation does not mean 
that operating manipulation is any 
more ethical than accounting manipu-
lation. Accountants' basic ethical con-
cern here should be whether such 
practices involve distortions that mis-
lead users of financial statements. 
Both accounting and operating ma-
nipulations can lead stakeholders to 
make inaccurate assessments of a 
company's economic health. 
Given the kinds of decisions stake-
holders make in light of reported earn-
ings, both accounting and operating 
manipulations can be damaging to 
their interests. Stakeholders rely on fi-
nancial statements, assuming that cur-
rent reported earnings indicate long-
term profitability. When earnings are 
managed so that financial statements 
do not reflect the economic health of 
the company accurately, stakeholders 
may make decisions they otherwise 
would not have made. B.ecause of its 
distorting effects, earnings manage-
ment is contrary to the "Standards of 
Ethical Conduct for Management Ac-
countants," which states, "Manage-
ment accountants have a responsibility 
... to disclose fully all relevant informa-
tion that could reasonably be expected 
to influence an intended user's under-
standing of the reports, comments and 
recommendations presented."2 
Our findings that accountants with 
more experience and higher positions 
in the organization are more tolerant of 
earnings management also is distress-
ing. It could be that persistent pressure 
for short-term earnings growth tends 
to diminish accountants' ethical val-
ues, particularly with regard to ma-
nipulation of earnings. Perhaps ac-
countants' ethical sensitivity weakens 
as they move up in a company, or, in 
some cases, accountants who already 
have loose standards regarding earn-
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING/ MARCH 1994 
ings management may be more likely 
to be promoted. 
This finding suggests that it is cru-
cial for accountants with a high level of 
responsibility in an organization to set 
a clear example concerning earnings 
management and truthful reporting. 
Newly hired accountants look to their 
more senior colleagues for guidance 
concerning ethical behavior. If senior-
level accountants engage in consider-
able earnings management, those at 
lower levels on the promotion ladder 
will learn quickly that the route to suc-
cess in the organization is not facilitat-
ed by truthful reporting. 
THE PROFESSION'S RESPONSE 
0 ur survey points out the need for individual accountants to become more sensitive to the 
ethical dimensions of earnings man-
agement. For example, accountants 
may feel pressured by their organiza-
tion to engage in earnings manage-
ment in order to make quarterly re-
ports look more favorable. Also, 
accountants may be concerned that 
their own performance evaluations will 
be based more on how favorable their 
prepared statements appear than on 
accuracy. Individual accountants need 
a clear understanding of the distorting 
effects of earnings management and 
the judgment and courage to resist 
these pressures. 
Because decisions by operating 
managers can distort reported earn-
ings significantly, management ac-
countants need to assume responsibil-
ity regarding operating decision 
manipulation of earnings. Manage-
ment accountants are held responsible 
by their organizations for the integrity 
of the financial reporting process. Dis-
torted earnings as a result of operating 
decision manipulation reflect negative-
ly on the performance of management 
Entry-level or 14 
junior accountant 
Experienced employee 55 
or senior accountant 
Supervisor or manager 124 
Executive or partner 56 
4 = ethical ; 3 =questionable; 2 = moderate; 
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accountants. Thus, management ac-
countants have a stake in the organiza-
tion's implementing procedures to de-
ter earnings management by means of 
operating decisions. As management 
accounting traditionally has been seen 
as a staff function, accountants may 
think it is not appropriate for them to 
"meddle" in the decisions of operating 
managers. But to the extent that the 
decisions of operating managers affect 
their ability to carry out their respon-
sibilities with integrity, management 
2.7381 3.1905 
3.4061 3.4667 
3.5242 3.6129 
3.5119 3.6012 
1 = serious; 0= unethical. 
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34 
EAR-NINGS MANAGEMENT QUESTIONS 
For each question, mark in pencil the letter on the General Purpose Data Sheet that best reflects your assessment of the ethical nature 
of the action as supervisor of the General Manager (GM) of the division. A = Ethical; B = Questionable; C = Moderate; D = Serious; 
E = Totally Unethical. 
1. The division's headquarters building was scheduled to be 
painted in 1992. But since profit performance was way ahead 
of budget in 1991 , the GM decided to have the work done in 
1991. Amount: $150,000. 
This information applies to the following two questions. The 
GM ordered division employees to defer all discretionary ex-
penditures (e.g., postpone employee travel, advertising, hir-
ing, maintenance) into the next accounting period so the divi-
sion could make its budgeted profit targets. Expected amount 
of deferrals: $150,000. 
2. The expenditures were postponed from February and March 
until April in order to make the first-quarter target. 
3. The expenditures were postponed from November and De-
cember until January in order to make the annual target. 
4. On December 15, a clerk ordered $3,000 of office supplies, 
and the supplies were delivered on December 29. This or-
der was a mistake because the GM had ordered that no 
discretionary expenses be incurred for the remainder of the 
fiscal year, and the supplies were not urgently needed. The 
company's accounting policy manual states that office sup-
plies are to be recorded as an expense when delivered. 
The GM learned what had happened and, to correct the 
mistake, asked the accounting department not to record the 
invoice until February. 
This information applies to the following three questions. 
In September, the GM realized the division would need 
strong performance in the fourth quarter to reach its budget 
targets. 
5. The GM decided to implement a sales program offering liberal 
payment terms to pull some sales that normally would occur 
next year into the current year; customers accepting delivery 
in the fourth quarter would not have to pay the invoice for 120 
days. 
6. The GM ordered manufacturing to work overtime in December 
so that everything possible could be shipped by the end of 
the year. ' . 
7. The GM sold some excess assets and realized a profit of 
$40,000. This information applies to the following two ques-
tions. At the beginning of December 1991 , the GM realized 
the division would exceed its budgeted profit targets for the 
year: 
8. The GM ordered the division controller to prepay some ex-
penses (e.g., hotel rooms, exhibit expense) for a major trade 
show to be held in March 1992 and to book them as 1991 
expenses. Amount: $60,000. 
9. The GM ordered the division controller to write down the in-
ventory due to obsolescence (i.e. , reduce its asset value and 
record a corresponding loss in the income statement). By tak-
ing a pessimistic view of future market prospects, the control-
ler was able to identify $700,000 worth of finished goods that 
conservative accounting would say should be written off even 
though the GM was fairly confident the inventory would still 
be sold at a later date at close to full price. 
This information applies to the following two questions. The 
next year, the division sold 70% of the written-off inventory, 
and a customer had indicated some interest in buying the rest 
of that inventory the following year. The GM ordered the divi-
sion controller to write the inventory back up to full cost. This 
would involve a $210,000 increase in the inventory asset val-
ue (which had been previously written down due to obsoles-
cence) and a corresponding increase in net income. The GM's 
motivation for recapturing the profit was: 
10. To be able to continue working on some important product 
development projects that might have been delayed due to 
budget constraints. 
11 . To make budgeted profit targets. 
This information applies to the following two questions. In 
November 1991 , the division was straining to meet budget. 
The GM called the consulting firm that was doing some work 
for the division and asked that the firm not send an invoice 
until next year. The firm agreed. Estimated work done but not 
invoiced: 
12. $30,000 
13. $500,000 
accountants should be involved. 
A number of things can be done to 
help accountants and managers be-
come more aware of the ethically dam-
aging effects of earnings management. 
For example, organizations could insti-
tute eth ics awareness seminars and 
workshops. Ethical analyses of specific 
earnings management situations could 
be included as case studies in profes-
sional publications. 
and operating manipulation could be 
adopted. Management accountants 
and their organizations could adopt 
specific monitoring procedures re-
garding operating manipulation. 
Address correspondence to: Prof Ken-
neth Rosenzweig, Department of Ac-
counting, University of Dayton, Dayton, 
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Also, a num ber of specific measures 
could be adopted to deter earnings 
management. Company recruitment 
policies could be revised to attract em-
ployees who already have ethical sen-
sitivity to issues such as earnings man-
agement. Eth ical codes that include 
explicit pol icies on both accounting 
Because of its potential to distort re-
ported earnings and mislead users of 
financial information, earnings man-
agement is a significant ethical con-
cern. I ndividual practitioners, their or-
ganizations, and professional 
associations should take steps to iden-
tify and deter this practice. • 
Kenneth Rosenzweig, CMA, CPA, CIA, 
is associate professor of accounting, and 
Marilyn Fischer is assistant professor of 
philosophy at the University of Dayton. 
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